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The international air transport industry has always
been a highly regulated industry. Air traffic rights are
valuable assets jealously guarded by governments and traded
like scarce commodities under bilateral air service
agreements. The ultimate objective of each nation being to
secure the best possible commercial advantage for its own
carriers.
In Hong Kong, Cathay Pacific has for many years been
the sole active Hong Kong based airline. Designation of
Cathay Pacific by the British Government as the Hong Kong
carrier for the purpose of operating routes provided for in
the bilateral air service agreements between the United
Kingdom and other nations has never posed any problem or
created any controversy up to the middle of 1985. The
establishment of Dragonair in June 1985, however, changed
the situation completely and brought into focus questions
such as the award of air transport license, the
one-route-one-airline Hong Kong Government air transport
policy, and the wider political issue of which airline
should be given the official recognition as THE Hong Kong
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airline, now that Hong Kong will become a Special
Administrative Region of the People's Repulic of China in
1997.
Dragonair's venture into the aviation world has been
plagued with a multitude of problems right from the very
start, the biggest of which was its failure to secure the
licenses for operating to major cities that were targeted in
its original plan and which are essential to its commercial
viability. Dragonair has cited the Hong Kong Government's
air transport policy and Cathay Pacific's agressive
expansion plans following Dragonair's inception as the main
contributory factors to its present predicament. THe Hong
Kong Government has so far adamantly maintained that its air
transport policy has been formulated with the best interest
of the people of Hong Kong in mind. Cathay Pacific, on the
other hand, is reiterating that the level and range of
services it provides already fully meets the demand of the
travelling public and there is no requirement for a second
Hong Kong airline.
Against this background, the research report is an
attempt to examine broadly the following issues:
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Does the present air transport regulatory environment and
the Hong Kong Government's air transport policy leave any
room for a second Hong Kong airline?
What is the impact of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on
the air transport industry in Hong Kong?
What are the problems that a new airline in Hong Kong has to
cope with and what sort of strategies must it adopt to
ensure commercial success?
What lessons can we learn from Dragonair's experience
The report will examine Lne air LLdr15pUt L L r- y ula t-V.L J
environment and the Hong Kong Government's air transport
policy and its implication for a new airline. It will also
look at the licensing process and the role played by the Air
Transport Licensing Authority as well as the system of
awarding air traffic rights and the negotiation of bilateral
air service agreements between governemnts. The political
and economic impact of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on
airlines and the future of the air transport industry will
also be examined.
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THE AIR TRANSPORT REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Air Traffic Rights and Bilateral Air Services Agreement
The rights to operate scheduled international air
services are matters that are decided and negotiated between
governments which result in the granting of traffic rights
under bilateral air services agreements. Under these
agreements, a government has the right to designate one or
more airlines which meet the designation criteria for the
purpose of operating the services on the routes that are
agreed and stipulated in the bilateral agreement. On receipt
of such designation, the other government will normally be
obliged to grant the appropriate operating authorizations to
the designated airline or airlines. However, it will have to
satisfy itself that a designated airline is qualified to
fulfil the conditions specified under the laws and
regulations applied to the operation of international air
services by its own aviation authorities and that
substantial ownership and effective control of that airline
are vested in the designating government or its nationals.
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In Hong Kong, the negotiation of bilateral air services
agreements affecting air transport services to and from Hong
Kong and the designation of airlines to operate such
services are undertaken by the British Government acting
with the advice of the Hong Kong Government.
The Air Transport Licensing Process and the ATLA
The existing system is that any Hong Kong based airline
which wishes to operate scheduled or non-scheduled
commercial air services from Hong Kong must first apply to
the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department for an Air
Operator's Certificate. The Air Operator's Certificate is
only granted to an airline if the Civil Aviation Department
is satisfied that the airline is professionally competent
and has the technical capability to secure the safe
operation of commercial services using the aircraft types
specified in the Certificate. After qualifying as a Hong
Kong airline by obtaining the Air Operator's Certificate,
the next step for the airline is to apply for a licence to
operate scheduled services or for a permit to operate
non-scheduled services to selected destinations.
All licence applications for scheduled services are
granted or disapproved by the Air Transport Licensing
Authority (ATLA), an independent body established under the
6Hong Kong Air Transport (licensing of Air Services)
Regulations and headed by a High Court judge. The ATL'.'s
terms of reference requires that in considering license
applications it has to give due recognition to the
coordination and development of air transport services in
Hong Kong to ensure that the public has access to an
effective service but without unnecessary and uneconomical
competition or overlapping.
If the application to the ATLA is successful, the last
step is to obtain designation by the British Government
through the Hong Kong Government to operate air services
where traffic rights existed under bilateral air services
agreements between the United Kingdom and the country of
destination. In circumstances where a Hong Kong airline has
applied for routes not covered by existing air services
agreements, or where a new Hong Kong airline is applying for
routes on which traffic rights existed but were already
taken up by an incumbent Hong Kong airline and there is no
provision for a second airline in that agreement, the
situation is far more complex although in theory the Hong
Kong Government can under such situaton request the British
Government to seek new rights or conclude a new agreement.
The Hong Kong Government's Air Transport Policy
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With the incorporation of Dragonair in Hong Kong, the
Hong Kong Government's air transport policy had become a
political hot issue in 1985. The Hong Kong Government, under
pressure from Dragonair to review its air transport policy
to allow it to compete with Cathay Pacific on equal terms
after the latter's unsuccessful attempt in securing license
to operate routes it had applied for, spelled out the
Government's air transport policy in a statement made to the
Legislative Council by the Financial Secretary on 20
November 1985. The policy is that the designation of
airlines for the purpose of operating routes to and from
Hong Kong which are provided for under bilateral air
services agreements will be limited to one Hong Kong based
airline per route and the airline first licensed by the ATLA
for a route will normally be the one to be designated for
that route.
Following repeated attempts by Dragonair to loony zne
Government to change its avaition policy and the submission
made by Dragonair to the Office of Members of the Executive
and Legislative Council (OMELCO), the Financial Secretary
made a further statement to the Legislative Council on 18
February 1987 to reaffirm the Government's aviation policy.
The Financial Secretary stated that the Government's
original one-route-one -airline statement still represented
the Government's policy in this area but that there had
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never been any intention on the part of the Government to
restrict the number of Hong Kong's airlines. He argued that
the Hong Kong public's interest was already well served on
the major routes out of Hong Kong where both Hong Kong and
foreign airlines offered direct scheduled services resulting
in a high degree of competition and a full range of choices
for travellers. While he reaffirmed that the general rule on
designation would be one airline per route, the Financial
Secretary stated that the rule is not invariable and if
traffic rights were available under air service agreements
without the need for inter-governmental negotiations then
the Hong Kong Governmemnt would ask for British Governemnt
designation for the applicant airline. However, he qualified
his statement by adding that if a new airline applied for
routes on which the traffic rights were already taken up by
an incumbent Hong Kong airline, renegotiation by the U.K.
Government with the foreign Government concerned would be
required and the price paid could be at the expense of the
incumbent and it would be unfair to require the incumbent
airline to reduce the level of its services simply to
accommodate another airline.
In response to the Government's policy statement,
Dragonair had charged that it was up against what it
considered to be a discriminatory aviation policy on airline
9
designation and argued that traffic rights should be awarded
on merit and on an equitable basis for the overall interest
of Hong Kong.
Implication for a new Hong Kong Airline
Given that the air transport licensing process and the
Hong Kong Government's air transport policy are likely to
remain unchanged in the foreseeable future, a new Hong Kong
based airline seeking to gain entry to the Hong Kong market
is faced with a major problem. It will not be able to select
the routes that it wants to operate to but has to live with
routes that it can realistically hope to secure licenses
from the ATLA and designation status from the Hong Kong/U.K.
Government. These would be routes that Cathay Pacific
currently do not operate or routes that Cathay Pacific holds
licenses but has elected not to operate for commercial
reason. If the present one-route-one airline policy remains
unchanged i.e. whoever gets licenses from the ATLA first
will normally be the only one who gets designation status
from the Government when the traffic right becomes
available, Cathay Pacific will whenever possible also apply
to fly to the same routes in order to edge out a competing
applicant on the strength of its infrastructure and
international experience. For routes that Cathay has ceased
to operate a new airline will stand a chance since the
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Financial Secretary had stated in his policy speech that the
Government would consider switching airline designations on
individual routes "where one airline has been licensed and
designated for a route but for commercial reasons choose not
to or ceases to serve that route". These routes, however,
are likely to be scattered, uncoordinated and relatively
unprofitable routes that do not form a commercially or
operationally viable route network that is suitable as a
core operation for a new airline to develop and build on.
For routes that air traffic rights currently do not exist
there will be the added problem of waiting for the result of
the next round of government-to--government bilateral air
service negotiation before an applicant knows whether it can
begin operation enen though it may have already been granted
licenses by the ATLA to serve the destinations.
11CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION
Sino-British Joint Declaration
Following two years of negotiation between the
governments of the United Kingdom and of the Pepole's
Republic of China on the future of Hong Kong, agreement was
reached on a negotiated settlement with the signing of the
Joint Declaration, a document which laid down the
fundamental basis under which Hong Hong will operate up to
and beyond 1997, the year when the People's Republic of
China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong
Kong.
As air transport matter is a highly senitive and
complicated issue, it is not surprising that the topic was
one of the last items that were addressed by the British and
Chinese negotiating teams before the Joint Declaration was
finally ratified and signed. The People's Republic of
China's policies on civil aviation matters relating to Hong
Kong was laid down in' Section IX of Annex 1 to the Joint
Declaration. The main theme is that Hong Kong will be
maintained as a centre of international and regional
aviation and airlines incorporated and having their
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principal place of business in Hong Kong may continue to
operate. As regard the regulation of air services after 30
June 1997, the following basic system will apply:
Air services between Hong Kong and other parts of the
People's Republic of China: The Chinese Government, in
consultation with the Hong Kong Government, will make
arrangements to provide for these services to be carried out
by airlines incorporated and having their principal place of
business in Hong Kong and by other airlines of China.
Air services between other parts of the People's ttepuDlic
of China and other states and regions with stops in Hong
Kong and air services betwen Hong Kong and other states and
regions with stops in other parts of the People's Republic
of China: These will be provided for under air services
agreements concluded by the Chinese Government which will
consult with Hong Kong and take into consideration the
Pr-nnnmic interests of Hong Kong.
All scheduled air services to, from or through Hong Kong
which do not operate to, from or through the mainland of
China: These will be regulated by air services agreements
or provisional arrangements negotiated and concluded by Hong
Kong acting under specific authorisations from the Chinese
Governement. For this purpose Hong Kong will be given the
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authority to negotiate and conclude such air services
agreements and provisional arrangements, to issue licenses
to airlines incorporated and having their principal place of
business in Hong Kong, and to designate such airlines under
the above agreements and arrangements, and to issue permits
to foreign airlines for services other than those to, from
or through the mainland of China.
In addition to the above provisions, the Joint
Declaration also laid down that Hong Kong will continue the
previous system of civil aviation management and will be
responsible on its own for matters of routine busines and
technical management of civil aviation, including the
management of the airports, the provision of air traffic
services within the flight information region of Hong Kong
and the discharge of other responsibilities allocated under
the regional air navigation procedures of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation.
Economic and Political Implication
At present it is necessary for any airline using
scheduled traffic rights available to Hong Kong (as
negotiated by the United Kingdom Government with foreign
governments) to be substantially owned and effectively
controlled by British nationals. This requirement will,
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however, be changed after 1997 following the resumption of
sovereinty over Hong Kong by China. Although the only
requirement laid down in the Joint Declaration for an
airline qualified to be considered as a Hong Kong airline
and be designated to operate air services on routes provided
for under bilateral air services agreements entered into
between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and
other countries after 1997 is that the airline has to be
incorporated and having their principal place of business in
Hong Kong, the political implication goes deeper than what
appears to be a straight forward definition.
After 1997, the United Kingdom will no longer undertake
the negotiation of bilateral air service agreements and be
responsible for the designation of airlines in Hong Kong,
with the task transferred to the Hong Kong Special
Administration Region Government or the Chinese Government,
depending on whether the routes concerned involve other
cities in China. The ramification and the political reality
are such that when there are more than one airline using
Hong Kong as its base and there are conflicts of interest
among these competing airlines, then the one which can claim
or prove to have more Hong Kong/Chinese interest or equity
participation, more representative of the people of Hong
Kong, will have the edge in the event a judgement has to be
made in favour of one of the competing airlines. This will
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become more and more so as we approach 1997 when
realistically we though reluctant to admit, have to concede
that the political element will figure quite high in
senitive areas such as aviation and air traffic rights. In
order to survive in the long term it would be highly
desirable for an airline to have some sort of political tie
up with China, either in the form of acquisition of equity
in the airline by Chinese authorities or institutions or
some form of joint venture or cooperation with airlines in
China. This will be a much needed long term political and
economic insurance policy. A new airline without any form of
political backing and treating it as a straight forward
business venture will more likely than not find itself
struggling or placed at a disadvantage than one that has
given this political element due consideration. Aviation,
unfortunately, is one of the few businesses which can never
be totally separated from politics, given its international
nature, political implication, high visibility, economic and
prestige value, bargaining power, and the inevitable




THE HONG KONG AIR TRANSPORT MARKET
AND THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
The Hong Kong air transport market is very active with
a large number of airlines competing for business and
providing the travelling public with a wide range of
frequencies and destinations. There are currently thirty-two
international airlines serving Hong Kong and providing
scheduled passenger and cargo services to literally every
part of the world. A further four airlines are operating
regular charter flights to and from Hong Kong. The following
are lists of the scheduled and charter airlines currently
operating into and out of Hong Kong:








































Competition is intense on most of the routes and for a
few high density regional routes, up to ten airlines are
competing for business on one single route. A summary of the
number of airlines operating in all the major "regional",
"European", "Trans-pacific", "Australian", and "China"
routes and the frequencies of their operation is given in
Appendix A:
REGIONAL ROUTES
The analysis shows that for the majority of the
established trunk routes there already exist a close to
capacity situation, with third party airlines providing
strong support to the two principal host airlines. The host
airlines, however, usually dominate the market on that
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particular route because of the high frequencies they are
able to offer and the support they invariably get from the
local people who tend to favour the national/home carrier.
For a few developing routes such as Kagoshima and Kota
Kinabalu, there are presently only one carrier but the
traffic is highly seasonal. These routes will have
difficulty in absorbing any additional capacity offered by a
EUROPEAN ROUTES
Basically traffic to Europe from Hong Kong still go
through the traditional London hub, although with strong
promotion and the gradual building up of frequencies, points
such as Paris, Rome and Amsterdam were beginning to figure
strongly as the first point of entry in Europe from Hong
Kong. The development of tourist package tours that commence
from cities other than London also helped to maintain this
trend. This trend is likely to continue and the development
of new routes to Europe and the increase in capacities to
cities like Paris and Rome in conjunction with the various




Considering the size of the market in this region, it
is evident that the scope of development would be very
attractive, particularly when Cathay Pacific is presently
operating to only a small number of destinations in this
region. The fact that the United States has more than one
carrier operating into Hong Kong will certainly help in the
negotiation of traffic rights for new destinations or
multiple desiqnations for Honq Konq airlines
AUSTRALIAN ROUTES
Traffic on these routes has been quite staDie in recent
years but because of the concentration of population and
development in a few big cities, there are limited
opportunity for the development of new routes. With only one
international airline operating out of Australia, the
Australian Government would be reluctant to negotiate
additional traffic rights for a new Hong Kong carrier. Hence
this region does not appear to offer any good opportunity
for a new carrier.
CHINA ROUTES
Air traffic in this region has been growing at a
tremendous rate in recent years. The present imbalance of
flight frequencies between the CAAC and the U.K. designated
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carrier Cathay Pacific would appear to provide ample scope
for a new airline in terms of the development of new routes
and getting a share of the market for the major routes
currently served by CAAC only or those which Cathay is only
allowed limlited frequency.
CATHAY PACIFIC'S ROUTE NETWORK
Cathay Pacific, a Hong Kong incorporated airline, has
been operating using Hong Kong as its base for over forty
years. It has developed into a major international carrier
and currently operates to 35 cities in 24 countries. A
summary of the destinations covered in Cathay Pacific's
route network and the flight frequencies is given below:
CATHAY PACIFIC










































According to statistics published by The Hong Kong
Tourist Association on airlines serving Hong Kong, Cathay
Pacific's share of the inbound passenger traffic has
increased to 29.9 per cent of all arrivals in 1986 and
ranked number one among all carriers. Its share for outbound
traffic is about 30 per cent. The rankings of the top ten
carriers in terms of inbound traffic are as follows:

















MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN TO A NEW HONG KONG BASED AIRLINE
Strategy Formulation
With, a strong and established airline like Cathay
Pacific already in the market and the large number of
foreign airlines operating out of Hong Kong on the
profitable high density routes, the biggest decision facing
a newcomer is whether it should identify a niche in the
market to avoid having to take on, at least initially, the
established competitors head on, or to launch an all out
attack right from the very start to compete for a market
share in the high visibility high density up-market routes.
In essence, the airline has to evaluate alternative
strategies and select the best and most appropriate strategy
having regard to the external environment and the
competition, the internal environment, its strength and
weakness, the opportunities and the potential threats to its
operation. Strategy always comes before structure and the
appropriate strategies 'for the airline have to be formulated
first before it can develop the most suitable company
structure to implement the strategies.
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The first major decision for the airline is to decide
on its route network strategy. The decision, however, is
compounded by the traffic right and licensing issues.
Assuming that the one-airline-one-route Hong Kong Government
policy is unlikely to change and knowing that Cathay Pacific
has already taken up almost all of the trafic rights
currently available under bilateral agreements which
normally only provided for the operation of scheduled air
services by one designated Hong Kong airline, the prospects
for the newcomer is very dim indeed and the options limited.
Under these circumstances, it is obvious that it makes sense
for the newcomer to avoid pursuing a strategy of full
frontal attack on Cathay Pacific and should instead consider
opting for the niche strategy.
Niche Strategy:
One possible strategy is to identify a few profitable
routes that have a resonable chance of getting multiple
designation and to lobby the Government to open avaition
talks with the foreign governments involved to fight for
designation status for a second Hong Kong carrier. Countries
which have more than one airline serving Hong Kong, for
example, may be willing to consider multiple designation of
Hong Kong airlines by the Hong Kong Government. The United
States, Britain and Japan are the only countries that belong
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to this category. However, there are usually pre-determined
frequency limitations in the air service agreements which
Means effectively that additional services granted to one
airline will necessitate a corresponding reduction of flight
frequency by another assuming that the routes concerned are
being adequately served. If the new airline is successful in
securing the requisite licenses and designation on these
profitable routes, it can then make these routes the
cornerstone of its operation, cross-subsidising the less
profitable or loss-making routes which will form the rest of
the network. These supplementary routes will require active
cultivation and development of the market to generate
sufficient traffic to breakeven and eventually become
profitable.
Another possible strategy is to bypass the problem of
trying to obtain scheduled status and instead go for the
charter tourist market to secondary resort destinations in
popular places such as Japan, Malaysia, and China. These
will be secondary destinations which are outside main city
areas that have the potential for the development of tourist
traffic. Cities in Japan outside the main Tokyo and Osaka
area are examples in this category. Direct air service links
between these cities and Hong Kong will obviate the need for
people to travel to big cities such as Tokyo and Osaka
before connecting a flight to Hong Kong.The marketing thrust
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will then be centred on promoting these resort areas which
Cathay Pacific does not operate to. This strategy will have
the advantage of avoiding direct competition with Cathay and
avoid the possible hostility and confrontation that may
result. By positioning in this sector of the market, the new
airline will complement the existing network of Cathay
Pacific and carve out a "specialist tourist charter" market
for itself. Considering the difficulties involved it
obtaining scheduled and designation status, this may be a
preferred option and will avoid the possible senario of
getting stuck in the maze of license application processes
while the aircraft is sitting idle on the ground, costs are
mounting and losses piling up, and is too late to get out
having make the enormous investment and financial
commitment.
A third possible strategy is to concentrate on the
China market and aim to be a specialist Hong Kong/China
carrier. China is the only country currently having a huge
imbalance of flight frequency under the U.K./China bilateral
air service agreement. Currently CAAC is the designated
Chinese carrier and operates some 60 flights between Hong
Kong and various cities in China per week while the British
designated carrier Cathay Pacific is only allowed to operate
2 flights to Beijing and 4 flights to Shanghai per week. In
future negotiations on traffic rihts the British Government
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will bound to seek redress on this imbalance. Hence the
China routes will be the most likely routes that can
accomodate additional capacities offered by a second Hong
Kong carrier.
A fourth strategy is to consider routes where traffic
rights exist under current bilateral air services agreement
(1) Cathay Pacific does not currently hold license from the
ATLA
(2) Cathay Pacific currently holds license from the ATLA but
has not taken up the privilege to start revenue
operation
(3) Cathay Pacific currently holds license from the ATLA and
is operating revenue service but evidence is available
to show that the traffic demand and the under-capacity
situation can support a second Hong Kong airline and it
is in the public's interest that a second airline be
granted a license.
Apart from the question of routes, the new airline will
have to consider carefully its corporate strategy, product
strategy, promotional strategy and marketing thrust to
integrate and interface with its chosen route strategy in
the face of strong competition.
but
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In terms of corporate strategy, the new airline will
need to pursue a growth strategy to aim at building itself
up to a reasonable size and expanding fairly rapidly during
the initial growth period to maximize its impact and sell
its name to the travelling public and to exploit the benefit
that it can obtain from the economy of scale. A small low
profile and stagnant type airline will not be able to
generate the kind of prestige and customer confidence
(normally still associated with the size of the company)
that is of paramount importance in attracting customers in
this part of the world. Big is still beautiful in the
aviation world and an airline of a lesser size will find it
difficult to compete with the big boys and may very quickly
be driven out of the market altogether. The airline's
mission will be to corner a segment of the market and to
build and consolidate around this core market, finding
niches, opening up new markets and competing with Cathay
Pacific on high density existing routes that offer the
opportunity for multiple airline designation.
The promotional strategy that it should adopt should
capitalize and focus on all its special features and any
advantages it has over Cathay Pacific (such as Cathay's
British connection) and other carriers. The Hong Kong
airline for the Hong Kong people theme should feature
strongly in its promotional campaign to identify it with the
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politically maturing Hong Kong public in the changing
political climate. The promotion should build on the notion
of an emerging new airline growing together with a new
generation Hong Kong to try to downplay its disadvantage
(new, inexperienced and an unknown quantity) and turn them
into advantages. The promotion can focus on a specific
strategic target that find the concept appealing.
As for the product strategy, the new airline will need
to look for differentiation. In other words it will have to
offer a product or a total package that are substantially
different to those offered by Cathay Pacific and other
carriers. Rather than jumping on the bandwagon and competing
with Cathay Pacific and other airlines on the business,
executive and club class concepts, the new airline can, for
instance, direct its thrust on the tourist market and design
may be in conjunction with tourist agents, a package that
is attractive to tourists. This approach may attract a
sizeable market of tourists who are fed up with the second
class treatment they usually get from airlines that spend
all their efforts in pampering businessmen and first class
passengers only. By positioning in this particular segment
of the market, a new airline will be able to exploit this
market niche and establish itself as a specialist tourist
airline instead of competing head on with its strong
competitors.
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In the case of Dragonair, its initial strategy was to
limit its initial operation to short to medium haul flights
to China. Dragonair's intention was to build up its network
around the proven Beijing and Shanghai routes, supplemented
by operations to secondary resort cities in other parts of
China. Having met with considerable difficultiies in
implementing this strategy because of the refusal by the
Civil Aviation Department to give permission for its charter
flights and the ATLA's rejection of its application for
licenses to fly to Beijing and Shanghai, Dragonair was
forced to revamp its master strategy and look at other
routes including long haul operations to London and
Amsterdam. Unfortunately application to fly to these points
also met with failure. The result of all these was that
Dragonair's initial planning and strategies were left in
disarray. Because of the uncertainty of what it should be
doing next, Dragonair was unable to formulate a set of
coherent strategies and tactics to respond to the changing
external and internal environment. The fact that it was only
allowed to operate low frequency charter services to low
density destinations, coupled with the restriction imposed
by the Civil Aviation Department on direct advertising by
non-scheduled carriers, makes promoting and selling the
airline to the travelling public an up-hill if not
impossible task.
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It appears from the above that in order for a new
airline to survive, it must adopt a two prone strategy. On
the one hand it will have to lobby the Hong Kong Government
with vigour and persistence to try to get the unfavourable
air transport policy modified and to pressure the Government
to start negotiation with foreign governments for multiple
designation, havivg identified from detailed market research
specific destinations that can absorb additional capacities
and where traffic imbalance exists. On the other hand the
new airline should adopt a combination competitive strategy
-- combining selected high density routes in the broad
overall market and niche in selected narrow market segments
in conjunction with a heavy promotional campaign for a
different product/package offered by Hong Kong's own airline
for a new generation of Hong Kong people.
Financial BacKing and Operating Costs
Given the high cost nature of airline operation and the
long and protracted process that the airline has to go
through from the beginning of the preparatory stage to the
day when revenue operation can commence, it is imperative
that the newcomer must have strong and committed financial
support to sustain the heavy drain of financial resources
during the preparatory phase and the initial launching phase
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when little or no revenue can be expected. Funds must be
adequate to finance aircraft and equipment acquisition, the
setting up of a professional organisation with the
associated infrastructure and specialist personnel that can
satisfy the requirement for the issue of the Air Operator's
Certificate by the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department, the
very first step in the long process before even the licenses
are applied for. In other words the shareholders must take a
long term view of their investment and accept the necessary
and high start-up cost and be commited to the airline's
future.
The total operating costs of an airline consist of two
major components: the direct operating costs and those
incurred as a necessary result of, and directly related to,
fly the aircraft. The indirect operating costs are not
directly related to the operation of the aircraft, but are
inbound as a result of operating services on the ground and
the usual overhead expenditure associated with the
management of a business.
An overall breakdown of airline expenses are:














(d) Total operating costs= (a)+ (b)+ (c)
(e) System non-operating costs
Interests and debt expenses
Taxes
For a new airline setting up in Hong Kong, the major
start-up costs will include the acquisition of aircraft and
associated equipment, the pre-service engineering work that
have to be performed to get the aircraft on the Hong Kong
register, the recruitment and training of both air and
ground crews and other support personnel for the operation,
and the leasing and fitting out of city and airport offices.
In addition, a new airline will usually have to negotiate
contracts with a large number of contrators for things like
catering, ground handling, cargo and baggage handling, and
aircraft maintenance. It is usually not practical for a new
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airline to attempt to do this in-house even though self
handling may be less costly and offers better control in the
long run Once the airline is in operation, the on-going
operating costs will include the costs associated with the
actual flying operation, the regular aircraft maintenance
and ground handling costs, promotional and other costs
required to support the operation.
Hence, the costs required to set up a new airline, to
launch its operation and to maintain its on-going operation
represent a hugh investment. In particular the expenditure
on promotion will be very high during the launching phase as
a heavy programme of promotion will be needed to sell the
airline which is still an unknown quantity to the public.
Strong financial commitment from shareholders and
comprehensive budgeting and cost control are essential to
ensure financial sucess. A case in point is Dragonair who at
one time was reported to be losing some HK$5 million per
month on its operation.
The following is the relative percentages of costs








































To an airline, aircraft acquisition undoubtedly
represents one of the biggest expenditure among the varios
costs that it has to invest in to lay the ground work for
the launch of its operation. For an airline wishing to enter
the Hong Kong market and incorporated as a Hong Kong based
airline, it has to have its aircraft ready first as part of
the prerequisite for the application of the Air Operator's
Certificate. That is where the problems lie if the airline
is planning to operate as a scheduled carrier. To operate
scheduled services, the airline has to (assuming that it has
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passed the hurdle of obtaining its Air Operator's
Certificate) apply to the ATLA for a license to fly on a
certain route and if that is approved, go on to apply for
Government designation. In other words, there is absolutely
no guarantee that the airline will be sucessful in getting
clearance to fly on that particular route. Hence, it is
clear that the selection of the aircraft is of paramount
importance because the aircraft has to be suitable for
serving on the route that the airline is applying before
ATLA will consider its application. However if the
application is rejected and the airline is forced to
consider an alternative route, it may end up with an
unsuitable aircraft for the new route, either because the
passenger capacity is incompatible with the forecast
passenger loading or the aircraft range is incompatible with
the stage length. Since it is so costly to invest in
aircraft, airlines can neither afford to invest in different
types of aircraft co cater for different routes in the
initial stage when it cannot be sure of getting the
necessary license and designation status nor can it afford
any costly mistakes by buying the wrong aircraft. It would,
therefore, be preferable under the circumstances for a new
airline to enter into arrangement to lease an aircraft for a
specified period rather than purchase the aircraft outright.
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Infrastructure and Human Resources
One of the problems that a new airline will have to
face will be in the area of human resources. Because of the
shortage of specialist personnel and aircrew, a new airline
will have difficulty in recruiting experienced personnel as
they invariably have to come from other competing carriers.
Experienced people may not be willing to take the risk of
joining a new airline that may not be able to obtain the
requisite licenses and designation from the Government.
Running an airline, and in particular launching a new
airline, requires a professional and experienced team of
specialists and it is critical that these people are
available at the outset when the airline has to prove to the
Civil Aviation Department that it has the right people of
the right calibre to mount a successful operation. The new
airline will need people with experience in finance to help
it put together the right financial package which is most
appropriate to the airline's needs. It will need people with
experience in airline sales and marketing to promote the
image of the airline and to sell it to the public. It will
need people with the technical and operational experience to
iron out the numerous problems that a new airline will
encounter. It will also need people with extensive knowledge
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aviation regulations to guide it through the maze of paper
works and statutory requirements to speed up the start-up
process.
The extensive ground support required both in Hong
Kong and in stations within the network to maintain the
flight operation will also present problems to the new
entrant, particularly when many of these expertise and
facilities have to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of
the Civil Aviation Department at the stage of the
application of the Air Operator's Certificate and well
before the airline have any idea on whether it will be
granted license and be designated to operate a certain
route. It is usually more cost effective to subcontract the
various ground support activities to established handling
agents both in Hong Kong and at the out-stations at the
initial stage when the requirements and needs of the airline
are still uncertain and have not been firmed up.
Self-handling may be considered as an option at a later
stage when route networks and operational plans have been
finalized.
The organization and structure of the airline must be
carefully planned and evaluated so that it will suit the
operating environment of the company. All the activities and
tasks need to be properly coordinated as the day to day
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operation of a new airline will likely to be a bit chaotic
in the beginning when things tend to move quickly and
planned actions have to be revised in reponse to changes
that have taken place and have not been thought of in the
planning stage. An organization structure with good
communication channels and clear responsibility definition
will help to shorten the learning curve and deal with the
inevitable teething problems that will be bound to crop up
during the start-up period.
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CHAPTER VI
THE CASE OF DRAGONAIR
Chronological Development
In order to understand and appreciate the problems
experienced by Dragonair since its inception in 1985, it is
necessary to trace through its development to hightlight the
significant events and milestones that may help to identify
the various contributory factors to its problems:
1985
9 April: Dragonair applied to the Civil Aviation Department
for an Air Operator's Certificate.
17 April: Dragonair signed a letter of intent for leasing
one B737-200 aircraft.
24 May: Dragonair was formally incorporated with a paid-up
capital of HK$200 million.
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19 July: Dragonair applied to the ATLA for permission to
operate scheduled services to Beijing, Shanghai and another
eight cities in China including six daily shuttle flights to
Guangzhou.
23 July: Dragonair's application for an Air Operator's
Certificate was approved by the Civil Aviation Department.
26 July: Dragonair operated its inaugural flight -- a
one-off charter to Kota Kinabalu.
17 August : The Civil aviation Department rejection
Dragonair's application to operate twice-weekly charter
flights to Beijing and a daily flight to Shanghai, citing
that approval of new flights would confuse the aviation
scene in light of the forthcoming Sino-British air services
talks and that it had not given permission for negotiation
between Dragonair and the Chinese aviation authority.
Permission for the charter flights had already been approved
by the CAAC earlier.
12 September : The Civil Aviation Department rejected for
the second time Dragonair's application for operating
charter flights to Beijing and Shanghai.
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24 October: Dragonair announced that Sir Y.K. Pao has
acquired a 30 per cent stake in the company and a HK$200
million capitalisation programme would be completed by the
end of the month.
8 November: Dragonair announced the appointment of Sir
Y.K.Pao as Chairman of the Board and Dr. Helmut Sohmen as
Managing Director.
13 November: Dragonair applied for a series of four charter
flights to Xiamen and also charters to Guilin and Hangzhou.
20 November: The Financial Secretary stated the
one-route-one airline air transport policy in the
Legislative Council.
3 December: Hearing held by the ATLA on the application by
Dragonair to operate scheduled servic.s to 10 cities in
China.
28 December: Dragonair was awarded licenses by the ATLA for
eight cities in China but in line with objection from Cathay
pacific, denied licenses to Beijing and Shanghai.
1986
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12 February: The Civil Aviation Department turned down
Dragonair's application to operate charter flights to
London.
26 June: Dragonair operated its first charter flight to
Houngzhou, China.
18 June: ATLA hearing was held to consider Dragonair's
applicatio to operate scheduled services to London,
Manchester and Amsterdam.
15 August: ATLA rejected Dragonair's application to operate
scheduled services to London, Manchester and Amsterdam but
granted Cathay Pacific licenses to operate on the Manchester
and Amsterdam routes.
6 October: Dragonair inaugurated its fourth route into
China with its first twice-weekly regular charter flights to
Guilin.
16 December : Dragonair started to operate scheduled
services to Chiangmai in Thailand.
22 December : Hearings held by the ATLA on Dragonair's
application to serve Kagoshima, Kumamoto, Oita and Nagasaki
in Japan, 14 destinations in China, Guam and Kathmandu.
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30 December: Dragonair reviewed that it had been losing
some HK$5 million per month.
1987
3 January: Dragonair announced it had ordered two new
McDonnel Douglas MD-11 wide-bodied aircraft, worth US$200
million, with delivery scheduled for January and February
1992. The MD-11 aircraft would allow Dragonair to fly
long-haul routes such as non-stop flights from Hong Kong to
points in Europe and the west coast of the United States.
5 January: Dragonair wrote to OMELCO stating that the
Government's aviation policy contrasted with the view of the
White Paper on airline competition policy issued by the
British Department of Transport as well as the world-wide
trend towards deregulation.
25 January: Dragonair started twice-weekly scheduled
services to Hatyai in Thailand.
27 January: Dragonair started regular charters to U-Tapao
in Thailand.
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10 February: Dragonair representatives met with the
Economic Services Panel of the OMELCO to argue the case for
a change in the Government's air transport policy.
13 February: Dragonair apply to the ATLA for licenses to
operate scheduled services to Beijing and Shanghai and
threepoints in Malaysia -- Kuala Lumpur, Johor Baharu and
Kota Kinabalu.
18 February: The Financial Secretary reaffirmed the
Government's one-route-one-airline air transport policy in
the Legislative Council.
21 February : Dragonair's shareholders agreed to inject an
additional HK$200 million capital into the airline, doubling
its paid-up capital to HK$400 million.
24 February : It was revealed that Cathay Pacific sought any
was given assurance by the Government that the one-route-one
airline government policy would remain in place prior to its
announcement of orders for new aircraft and equipment worth
$12.8 billion, which would benefit British industry to the
tune of some $2.5 billion.
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25 February: ATLA approved Dragonair's application to serve
Kagoshima, Kumamoto, Oita and Nagasaki in Japan, 14
destinations in China, Guam and Kathmandu.
Up to early March 1987, Dragonair has been granted by
the ATLA licenses for operating scheduled air services to 33
destinations, although traffic rights do not exist for the
majority of the routes. A summary of the license status is
given in Appendix B.
Problems
Since its incorporation in Hong Kong in 1985, Dragonair
has encountered a variety of problems which together had
prevented it from realizing its ambition of becoming a full
fledged scheduled airline capable of mounting a serious
challenge to the established local carrier Cathay Pacific.
The main stumbling block to Dragonair is undoubtedly its
inability to secure routes that can generate healthy
revenues to form the backbone of its operation. There are
also other factors which contributed to Dragonair's
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problems. The following are highlights of the various
problem areas that Dragcnair had to deal with along its
troubled path
Initial problem over the nationality of Dragonair's
shareholder: Dragonair had been plagued by the nationality
question ever since its shareholding was first announced in
June 1985. The nationality of Dragonair's shareholders
became an issue when aviation analysts pointed out that the
airline's substantial Chinese backing (The Hong Kong Macau
International Investments was then the sole owner of
Dragonair) might preclude it from being able to operate out
of Hong Kong since the bilateral air service agreements
between the United Kingdom and other countries require that
the carrier designated by Britain be substantially owned and
effectively controlled by British nationals. The question
was resolved only when shipping magnate Sir Y.K. Pao and
textile company owner Ronald Chao, both British passport
holders, became the two major shareholder of Dragonair in
October 1985, with Sir Y.K. taking a 30 percent and Chao a
19.5 percent stake in Dragonair. The Hong Kong Macau
International Investments retained a 25 per cent stake in
the airline. The restructuring of the shareholding got round
the question of nationality as Dragonair could then be
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technically classified as a British carrier for the purpose
of designation by the U.K. Government on routes available
under bilateral agreements.
Lack of understanding of government procedures and the
licensing process in the initial stage : Dragonair showed
that it was not very familiar with the government machinery
in the early days of its infancy when it failed to go
through the formality of applying first to the Civil
Aviation Department for permission to negotiate with the
Chinese Authority on operating regular charter flights to
Beijing and Shanghai. Instead Dragonair went straight to the
Chinese authorities first and was given preliminary approval
by Chinese officials to run the charter operation. Dragonair
was not aware of the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department
requirement and mistakenly thought that all it needed to do
was to go to the Chinese Authority direct and obtain the
necessary approval. This was later cited by the Civil
Aviation Department as one of the reasons for rejecting
nrannair's application to operate to Beijing and Shanghai.
Cathay Pacific's agressive expansion plan following
Dragonair's establishment : Cathay Pacific, in response to
Dragonair's entry to the aviation scene once dominated by
itself, reacted quickly to plug all the holes by commencing
operation to destinations where it held licenses and had
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been designated on the routes but had chosen up to then not
to operate for economic or other reasons (such as Sari
Francisco, Paris and Rome). Cathay also re-commence
operation to cities where it had cease to run scheduled
service because of poor load factor (such as Nagoya in
Japan). For routes that it had no license but which
Dragonair had applied to the ATLA (those that are
potentially profitable), Cathay also submitted its
application (such as Amsterdam and Manchester) and
eventually won the licenses. This aggressive approach by
Cathay had a very significant impact on Dragonair and
Dragonair was only able to obtain licenses from the ATLA on
routes with unknown or little prospect and for which Cathay
did not put in a competing application. In fact in all cases
where Cathay put in a competing application, Cathay was
awarded the licenses at the expense of Dragonair.
Unfavourable government policy on air transport: when
Dragonair was formed in 1985, there was then neither
explicit government policy on areas such as multiple
designation on a route nor criteria for the designation of
airline since there was no previous need for such a clear
definition when Cathay Pacific was the only Hong Kong based
airline operating out of Hong Kong prior to Dragonair's
entry. However, just one day before the ATLA hearing was due
to be held on Dragonair's first application to operate
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scheduled services to cities in China, the Governmen
announced for the first time its one-route-one-airline air
transport policy. It is a matter of conjecture on whether
this had any influence on ATLA's eventual judgement in the
event its decision was at odds with the stated governmen
policy. Despite heavy representation and lobbying to the
Government and to the OMELCO, the Government did not bow
under the pressure and reaffirmed its one-route-one-airline
policy in the Legislative Council. This puts Dragonai
clearly at a disadvantage as Cathay had already, over th
years, gained licenses for all the lucrative and profitably
routes and having been designated on these routes firs
Dragonair would not pose any threat as long as the policy
remain in force.
Difficulty in formulating a coherent marketing stretegy and
creating a "brand " image and identity : One of Dragonair's
major problems is that it was not able to formulate a
suitable marketing strategy for its intended operation due
to the fact that what it can or cannot do is effectively
outside its control and will not be known until at a late
stage when the ATLA hearing had been concluded, when traffic
rights had been negotiated under bilateral air service
agreement, and when the result of government's designation
is known. Plans drawn up previously had to be discarded or
revised drastically following an unfavourable decision by
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the Government or the ATLA. In effect, because of the
initial chaos resulting from the sudden need to change its
plans Dragonair was uncortain of what it would be doing
next, let alone what sort of stretegies or tactics it should
adopt and how it should market itself - an unknown quantity
- to the public. During the early days of its formation the
travelling public was excited to see that more competition
and choices would be available. However,when rejection of
Dragonair's application for licenses to operate scheduled
service or permits to operate charter serviecs came one
after another, the distinct impression that the public got
was that Dragonair was on an uphill battle and started to
wonder whether it would ever got off the ground. In the
airline business it is essential for an airline,
particularly a newly established airline, to establish a
identity that the travelling public can identify and
associate with and differtiate from its competitors. In
Dragonair's case, it had difficulty in consistently
projecting an identity because of the uncertainty of its
operation that forced it to repeatedly shift its position to
adjust and respond to the problem posed by its failure in
securing licenses for routes that it had applied for. When
it first came into being, the thrust of its promotional
campaign focussed on the fact that it was a Hong Kong
airline owned and run by Hong Kong people as opposed to
Cathay Pacific which although is operating using Hong Kong
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as its base is ultimately controlled by the Swire Group in
London. It was not clear to the public then whether
Dragonair was aiming to be a full fleged international
airline-- an alternative to Cathay Pacific, a regional
feeder carrier to supplement Cathay and other international
carriers, a tourist based charter carrier, or a China
specialist. Its first application to operate to Beijing,
Shanghai and other cities and China gave the impression that
it would, at least initially, be concentrating on the Hong
Kong/China market and operates as a China specialist. The
rejection by the ATLA of its application to operate to
Beijing and Shanghai-- the only potentially profitable
routes amomg the ten cities that Dragonair hoped to operate
to, however, forced Dragonair to shift its position. Rather
than confining and consolidating its operation to China in
the launching phase, Dragonair was forced to revise its plan
and apply for long haul routes like London, Manchester and
Amsterdam. It was necessary then to promote the
international nature of the airline to reflect its new route
structure. The rejection by the ATLA of its application to
operate scheduled and charter flights to London and
scheduled services to Manchester and Amsterdam, however,
forced Dragonair to revise its plan once again. Knowing that
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
secure license to operate to any of the established long
hauled routes under the circumstances, Dragonair was forced
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to look at secondary destinations that were outside Cathay
Pacific's network and new routes that have the potential to
generate tourist traffic. The result of these repeated
shifting of position in response to setbacks and rejection
of applications is that Dragonair is unable to establish an
identity that it can build on and gave the unfortunate
impression to the public of a struggling regional charter
airline flying to remote areas only.
Disadvantage in promotiom: One of the regulations governing
the aviation business is that airlines operating charter
flights are not allowed to advertise, to sell tickets direct
to customers, or to maintain any ticketing sales office. All
sales of tickets have to be done through travel agents. All
these measures have handicapped Dragonair in its initial
operation when it could only run charter operation (until
Dragonair attained scheduled airline status in December 1986
following the granting of licenses by the ATLA to operate
scheduled services to four cities in Thailand and the Thai
and U.K. Government reached agreement on traffic rights and
Dragonair was designated on the routes) and was therefore
prevented from promoting and marketing itself, something
which is detrimental to a new airline as in the airline
business it is essential to maintain high visibility. A
newly established airline, in particular, requires heavy
initial promotion to develop its character and identity to
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attract new customers and lure customers away from other
established airlines. Other restrictions on charter
operation such as prohibition from flying during the peak
period from 12.30 p.m. to 4.00 p.m. put a further constraint
on the flexibility of its operation.
Operating Losses: It was reported at one stage that
Dragonair was making a loss of some HK$5 million per month.
Its regular charter flights to cities in China was doing
relatively well at an average 50% load factor, carrying some
27,000 passengers during its first five months of operation.
The scheduled flights to Thailand, however, proved to be a
disaster as the cities are resort areas and traffic is
highly seasonal and require a period of heavy promotion
before it can generate demand and attract sufficient number
of tourists. A number of flights had to be cancelled due to
sub-economical number of passengers. Apart from the routes
to Thailand, the new routes granted by ATLA in its last
application (cities in resort areas of Japan, Guam, Katmandu
and Dhaka) are unknown quantities and passenger volume can
fluctuate widely. Until such time when Dragonair obtains
licenses to operate to places such as Beijing and Shanghai
where a steady established traffic flow exists and can
generate regular revenues and form the main core of
Dragonair's operation and the utilization of its aircraft
improves, the loss situation is unlikely to reverse.
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Mismatch of Aircraft and Routes: Instead of acquiring the
aircraft suitable for flying a certain route, Dragonair was
placed in an awkward position and has to do it the other way
round. It has to get the aircraft first before it applied
for licenses to routes it intend to operate without knowing
whether it would be granted the license. A refusal by ATLA
would mean Dragonair had to start looking at alternative
routes. The routes chosen, if incompatible with the aircraft
it already got, would create additional problems.
Poor aircraft utilization: Since the original network of
planned and coordinated routes has been dismembered as a
result of rejection of license application and
unavailability of traffic rights, leaving behind segmented
routes that Dragonair has to live with even though they may
be unsuitable combination in terms of stage length,
frequencies and compatibility. The low traffic density and
the problem of scheduling make continuous and full economic
use of aircraft very difficult. The result is that aircraft
utilization could not be optimized.
British Politics: It was reviewed in letters attached to
Cathay Pacific's submission to the OMELCO's Economic
Services Panel (in response to Dragonair's complaint to
nM'r.rn on the Government's discriminatory air transport
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policy) that Cathay Pacific sought and was given assurances
by the Government that its one-route-one-airline air
transport policy would remain in place prior to Cathay's
order of aircraft and engines worth $12.8 billion. Cathay
emphasised in its letter to the Financial Secretary that out
of this $12.8 billion, some $2.5 billion will be the Rolls
Royce content and that the order would be particularly
significant to Rolls Royce as the order would be the launch
order for Rolls Royce's new generation of large engines,
benefiting Rolls Royce and the British economy with real
employment benefits for Britain. The letter added that
Cathay could not continue to make the sort of enormous
investment without the confidence that its existing
portfolio of traffic rights would continue to have full
Government support. The letter also reviewed that the
British Government was consulted on the issue before Cathay
was given the assurance. There is, therefore, a guestion
mark hanging over the issue on whether the large potential
benefit to the British industry and employment had in fact
influenced the eventual decision on the Hong Kong
Government's aviation policy, given that cancellation or the
threat of cancellation of an order the size of Cathay's
would land the British Government in political trouble.
59
Official recognition of Cathay Pacific through the
acquisition of Cathay shares by the China International
Trust and Investment corporation: In what is widely seen as
a politically inspired move by Cathay to turn to China for
support for its campaign to prevent Dragonair from mounting
a serious challenge to its dominant position, China
International Trust and Investment Corp, China's
international investment arm, was allowed to buy a 12.5 per
cent stake in Cathay Pacific in late January 1987 when
Cathay issued 212 million new shares to CITIC at $5 each, a
10 per cent discount on the price which was traded in the
market before trading of Cathay's shares were suspended. By
forging a relationship with a powerful China-backed
corporation, Cathay Pacific has gained a high degree of
political muscle which was previously the domain of
Dragonair only through its various Chinese connection. The
move will also strengthen Cathay's Hong Kong status and
ensure its success through and beyond 1997 since the equity
acquisition will confer official recognition of Cathay
Pacific as Hong Kong's airline by China. The result is that
Dragonair has lost the only advantage it has over Cathay
Pacific up to this point of time--- its ties to Beijing
which it had hoped, when it was established in 1985, could
give it a potential long term edge over Cathay.
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Delay in holding aviation talks between China and the United
Kingdom: Although Dragonair has been awarded licenses by
the ATLA to operate to 22 destinations in China as a result
of two separate hearings to consider applications by
Dragonair, there are no traffic rights in existence under
the current bilateral services agreement between China and
the United Kingdom for operating scheduled air services by a
designated Hong Kong carrier. The delay in starting the
talks has prevented Dragonair from offering scheduled
services to China, the axis of its operation, and to
establish itself in the Hong Kong market by proving that it
has the capability and expertise.
Failure to obtain licenses for the Beijing and Shanghai
routes: Scheduled services to Beijing and Shanghai were
originally the cornerstone of Dragonair's proposed China
network when it applied to the ATLA for licenses to operate
scheduled services to 10 cities in China. Of the ten cities
only Beijing and Shanghai represented potentially profitable
routes with a real demand for additional capacities. The
majority of the others were routes that required time to
develop and which were likely to be unprofitable in the
initial stage. Hence, Licenses to Beijing and Shanghai were
an important part of the total package of China services if
the China operation were to be economically viable. The
rejection by the ATLA to grant Dragonair the Beijing and
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Shanghai routes which were subject to a formal objection by
Cathay Pacific had therefore put Dragonair in a difficult
position
Lessons to be learned
The Importance of Detailed Research and Traffic Forecast
So far Dragonair has had three applications for routes
flown by Cathay Pacific considered by the ATLA. All three
were rejected by the ATLA on the basis of uneconomical
overlapping as provided for in the Air Transport (LIcensing
of Air Services) Regulations --- not because of the
Government's designation policy (assuming that ATLA's
decision is based alone on the traffic criteria and in no
way influenced by the Government's publicly declared air
transport policy). In other words, Dragonair has failed to
persuade the ATLA and to convincingly substantiate its claim
that the traffic on the routes concerned were sufficient to
sustain a substantial operation by a second Hong Kong
airline and that it is in the public interest to provide
more competition and choice for the consumers. Hence, before
a new airline applies to the ATLA for a license to operate
on a certain route, it must carry out detailed research on
the traffic pattern, establish the potential traffic growth,
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and make projections based on the growth pattern anc
potential traffic generation stimulated by the introduction
of a new airline and the associated heavy promotion of the
route. All these have to be backed up by strong evidence
that can convince the ATLA to make a judgement in favour of
the new airline.
Judging from the result so far, it is obvious that
unless the evidence is overwhemingly clear that the traffic
demand justifies the licensing of another carrier, the
chance of gaining a license from the ATLA by a new airline
for routes that Cathay Pacific is already operating is very
slim indeed. The benefit of the doubt is invariably given to
the incumbent carrier in the event Cathay Pacific formally
objected to the new airline's application and traffic
forecast produced by the two side are in disagreement.
Long Haul Routes
Dragonair nas so far failed to obtain a single license
from the ATLA for long haul routes, whether it is a route
which Cathay is already operating (such as London), or a
route which Cathay holds no license but is applying in
competition to Dragonair (and eventually winning the
license). Apart from the traffic demand consideration, ATLA
h,» in9icated that the decision is partly taken on the basis
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that Cathay Pacific already has all the infrastructure in
place and has proven experience in successfully operating to
long haul destinations whereas Dragonair does not have
comparable attributes. The implication is clear that it
would be unwise for a new airline to apply for long haul
routes before it had built up a regional or short to medium
network with a sucessful track record, an important factor
in the deliberation by the ATLA in its license application.
Without this operational experience which can lay the ground
work for moving onto long haul operation which by its nature
calls for a higher degree of planning, administrative and
operational expertise, a new airline does not realistically
stand a fighting chance in edging out the established and
experienced Cathay Pacific.
Political Issue
The major hurdle facing Dragonair is still the
Government's one-route-one-airline policy and it is in this
area that Dragonair should tackle with vigour and
persistence. Once this fundamental stumbling block is
removed, Dragonair will be able to compete with Cathay
Pacific on an equal footing. The present ruling is so
favourable to Cathay Pacific and Cathay is in such a
dominant position that Dragonair is not really competing
with Cathay in the real sense of the word. Political
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pressure would have to come before commercial pressure if
Dragonair is to stand any real chance of commercial success.
Dragonair must first obtain formal endorsement and
acceptance from China and then get China to persuade the
U.K./H.K. Government to change the ruling in return for a
more balanced China/U.K. Bilateral Air Service Agreement.
This would undoubtedly be a protracted affair but having
made the financial and political commitment to get the
airline off the ground, Dragonair should go all the way to
ensure not just of its survival but its long term commercial
success.
Strategy
So far Dragonair has, intentionally or unintentionally,
pursued a strategy of confrontation towards Cathay Pacific.
The result is hostility between the two airlines with Cathay
aggressively fighting every inch of the way and tripping
Dragonair at every corner. What Dragonair could consider as
an alternative strategy is cooperation and collaboration
with Cathay. It could enter into detailed negotiation with
Cathay to see if they could jointly work out a solution
which can give Dragonair a life line but without threatening
the status quo of Cathay. Although on the surface it does
appear that Cathay is in such a commanding position that it
has no real need or incentive to want to pursur this route,
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some form of agreement would remove the uncertainty and
threat to Cathay that it may be prepared to pay a price to





Commercial Viability of a Second Hong Kong Airline
From a straight commercial point of view, it is quite
clear that in order to be assured of commercial success,
that is, the operation becoming profitable in a reasonable
period of time after launching, a new airline hoping to use
Hong Kong as a base must somehow be able to secure licenses
and designation status for a few established profitable
routes having a stable traffic demand and then build a
network around these "bread and butter" routes. There is
little indication, so far, that the Government's
one-route-one-airline policy will undergo any drastic
changes in the foreseeable future. The chance of other
governments agreeing to multiple designation on the major
high density routes (with the exception of possibly China)
is not optimistic. Hence, the profitable routes that are
life and blood to a new airline are essentially out of reach
to the airline. The commercial risk of gambling on a network
of all "developing" routes would be so high that it would
amount to commercial suicide since the investment an airline
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has to make would be way out of proportion to the return on
investment associated with the operation on such untried and
uncertain routes. So unless there are changes to the
existing government policy or China is willing to open up
its door to allow a second Hong Kong airline to operate the
Beijing and Shanghai routes, the conclusion would have to be
negative. There is no room for a second profit-making
commercial airline in Hong Kong under the present economic
and political climate. This conclusion, of course, only
applies to a normal commercial venture. It will not hold
true for an airline which for political or other reasons,
has an overriding need to establish itself in Hong Kong and
is prepared to absorb the kind of losses that would be
unacceptable to a commercial venture in order to maintain
its presence so that it is well placed to take advantage
of,say, future political or economic changes.
If an airline is to overcome the heavy odds against
its success, it has got to formulate a set of superior
strategies for its marketing mix and find a niche in the
market that can avoid direct confrontation and competition
with Cathay Pacific. A two prong competitive strategy should
be adopted in which strong and persistent lobbying of the
Government on the air transport policy, traffic right and
multiple designation issues will be a major part of the
equation. The combination of high density routes in the
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broad overall market, niche in selected narrow market
segments, and the development as a specialist tourist
carrier for the rapidly growing China and Japan market and
other potential regional resorts in conjunction with
established travel agents will be the other. Based on this
strategy and integrating it with strong promotion using the
Hong Kong airline theme and a new approach to provide a new
product- personal service for the tourist market- should
help to pave the way for a viable operation if government
policy and the traffic rights question do not prove to be
stumbling blocks.
Future Prospects of The Hong Kong Air Transport Industry
It would appear that the future Hong Kong air transport
industry will still be basically an one airline affair with
Cathay Pacific continuing to dominate and grabbing the
lion's share of the market. By associating itself with the
Chinese international investment arm CITIC, Cathay has got
itself a long term insurance policy and should be able to
withstand any political shocks that may come its way after
1997. A likely scenario after 1997 would be Cathay retaining
its present portfolio of international routes while
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Dragonair would specialize on the growing China market and




























































































































No. of Flight per weekAirline
4Royal Nepal
KATMANDU
No. of Flight per weekAirline
4Royal Nepal
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STATUS OF LICENSES HELD AND APPLIED FOR BY DRAGONAIR





.Licenses granted, Traffic rights do not exist, operating












Licenses granted, Traffic rights do not exist, pending
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